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JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this Court lies in Rule 48, RUSC, pursuant
to the Court's grant of Plaintiffs1 Petition for Writ of
Certiorari on July 6, 1989.

This Court is reviewing the decision

of the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, Honorable

Pamela Greenwood, Honorable Gregory Orme, and Honorable Richard
Davidson sitting, in an opinion reported at 771 P.2d 677, (Utah
App. 1989), unanimously affirmed the Judgment entered by the
Trial Court, Third District of Summit County, Honorable Leonard
Russon presiding, dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs1 Complaint
and all causes of action brought thereunder following a trial on
the merits.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
District Court's Ruling that Plaintiffs were barred by
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5 (1987).

2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
District Court's ruling that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1
(1987) was inapplicable.

3.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
District Court's ruling that Plaintiffs failed to show
adverse possession.
1

4.

Whether Plaintiffs properly asserted the Utah
Marketable Record Title Act, Utah Code Ann. §57-9-1
through 10 (1976), and if so, is such Act applicable,

5.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
District Court's ruling that Plaintiffs1 Claim for
Prescriptive Easement was meritless.

6.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
District Court's ruling that Park City Municipal
Corporation was not liable for the act of an
independent third party destroying a shack.

7.

Were Plaintiffs barred by failing to comply with the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act §63-3 0-1 through 38,
Utah Code Ann. (1989.)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. §57-9-1 - 10 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. §57-9-3 (1953 as Amended)
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1 (1987)
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-9(4) (1953)
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-10 (1954 as Amended)
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-11
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12 (1953 as Amended)
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-13 (1953)
Rule 489, RUCS
Rule 48, URCP
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a quiet title action to determine the ownership of a
certain parcel of real property (hereinafter "subject property")
located in Summit County, Utah,

Plaintiffs Velma Marchant, et

al., (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), also seek damages for
destruction of a shack on the property.
Plaintiffs claimed the subject property through a number of
theories including superior title, adverse possession,
prescriptive easement and boundary by acquiescence.

Defendant

State of Utah (hereinafter "State") claimed a superior title
which had not been undermined by any of Plaintiffs1 theories.
After a two-day trial the Court issued a five-page
Memorandum Decision and thereafter entered a Judgment in
accordance with its decision dismissing with prejudice all of
Plaintiffs1 claims to the property and their claim for damages.
The Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, but subsequently the
appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Rule 4A, RUSC.
Appeals.

The appeal was thereafter argued to the Court of

On March 13, 1989 the Court of Appeals announced its

unanimous opinion affirming in total the Trial Court's ruling.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is published at 771 P.2d 677
(Utah App. 1989).
Plaintiffs then petitioned this Court for a Writ of
Certiorari, which was granted on July 6, 1989.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Plaintiffs1 Brief misstates certain important facts and
omits other material facts upon which the Trial Court based its
Judgment and the Utah Court of Appeals based its decision
affirming the Trial Court.

1.

Abandonment of Subject Property.

The earliest fixed date of claimed use of the subject
property by Plaintiffs1 alleged predecessor was not until 1925.
(TR. 29-30.)

Any use of the subject property by any and all of

Plaintiffs' alleged predecessors ceased and the property was
abandoned by Plaintiffs in approximately 1964.

(TR. 66-67.)

Plaintiffs admitted to never possessing the property.
66.)

(TR. 65-

During the eighteen-year period from 1964 until this action

was brought in 1982, the property was not used or possessed by
Plaintiffs or by anyone through whom they claim.

(TR. 65-66.)

Every witness who observed the property, including plaintiff
Merle Anderson, testified as to the abandoned nature of the
property, including the vacant and deteriorating shack with no
windows and no door, the unkempt yard overgrown with weeds and no
discernible use of the property during the entire eighteen-year
period prior to the filing of the action by Plaintiffs. (TR. 6667, 109-110, 217-218, Vol. 2, p. 6.)

4

The testimony of Building Inspector Ron Ivie, who inspected
the shack on the subject property in 1981, is that the shack
appeared to be abandoned and open without windows or doors and
there was no sign of any repair or rehabilitation of the shack.
(TR. 109-110, 118.)
Plaintiffs1 claim of use of the subject property, after
1964, by their own admission, consisted primarily of a single
annual visit to the property which was uninhabited and unused.
(TR. 65-69.)
Payment of Taxes on Subject Property by State f s
Predecessors.

2.

According to the records of Summit County and the testimony
of Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven Martin, the earliest
record of payment of property taxes on the subject property was
1931.

(TR. 208, Ex. 43.)

From 1931 to 1969 taxes for the

subject property were assessed to predecessors in the State's
Chain of Title, and were paid every single year.
Ex. 43.)

(TR. 203-206,

From 1969 to the trial in 1986, the property was tax

exempt because it was owned by Park City and then the State.
(TR. 206, Ex. 43.)
This testimony and records of Summit County were
corroborated by Edwin L. Osika, Vice President and SecretaryTreasurer of United Park City Mines Company, the state's
predecessor and the owner of the subject property from 1953 to
1969.

(Ex. 32.)

Mr. Osika presented proof of payment of real

5

property taxes on the subject property by United Park City Mines
Company for each year from 1953 to 1969.

3.

(TR. 169-170, Ex. 35.)

Payment of Taxes by Plaintiffs or Their Predecessors.

While Plaintiffs maintained that their claimed predecessors
had paid taxes on the subject property, Plaintiff Merle Anderson
could only testify of payment for 1981 and one other year.
69-70.)

(TR.

Plaintiff Merle Anderson also admitted that she had no

knowledge of any payment of taxes by the Plaintiffs or their
claimed predecessors prior to 1966.

(TR. 70.)

No other

Plaintiff or Witness testified regarding payment of taxes by
Plaintiffs or their claimed predecessors.
Plaintiffs1 claim of payment of taxes prior to 1966 is based
solely on certain exhibits introduced at trial.

One such Exhibit

(Ex. 13) is a letter from then Summit County Treasurer Reed Pace
to Charles Rolfe which states that "In the year 1955 you paid
taxes of $8.06 and in 1956 you paid taxes in the amount of
$7.3 3."

However, no evidence was introduced as to what property

Mr. Pace was referring in his letter.

Mr. Pace testified at the

trial that he did not remember what property he was referring to
in the letter.

(TR. 182.)

The letter was addressed to Charles

Rolfe, Oakley, Utah, (Ex. 13), and could be referring to any
parcel of property in Park City.
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The only other exhibits upon which Plaintiffs rely for
payment of taxes are several deeds issued by Summit County.

Two

Quit Claim tax deeds were issued by Summit County in 1914 and
1917 (Exhibits 5 and 6 ) , and a tax deed in 1963 (Exhibit 7 ) .
These deeds were issued subsequent to a tax sale.

None of the

deeds introduced by Plaintiffs contain a locatable description of
any parcel of real property and were admitted solely under a
Stipulation as to being authentic but not as to any relationship
with the subject property.

(TR. 31-32.)

No seven-year period

where plaintiffs or their predecessors paid taxes was identified
and there is no other evidence of payment of taxes by plaintiffs
or their claimed predecessors.

4.

Documents Through Which Plaintiffs Claim Title.

1.
A quit claim deed from Dan and Belle McPolin
to Jesse McCarrell dated March 19, 1906 for "that
certain one-story framed, three-room dwelling house
situated on the easterly side of Silver Creek and about
100 feet easterly from the lumberyard of the Summit
Lumber Company." (Ex. 4 .)
2.
A quit claim deed from Summit County to William
Rolph dated June 10, 1914 for $28.68 for "[iImprovements
East U.C. Tracks, Pack City, Utah." The quit claim deed
states that the deed is "made from title secured from a tax
sale in the year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to Summit
County, dated May 1st, 1914." (Ex. 5.)
3.
A quit claim deed from Summit County to
William Rolfe dated June 21, 1917 for $1.00 for "that
certain frame dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park
City, Summit County, Utah, assessed to William Rolfe in
the year 1912." (Ex. 6.)
4.
A tax deed from Summit County to Charles
Rolfe dated June 13, 1963 for "House in lumber yard,"
7

stating fl[t]his conveyance is made in consideration of
payment by the Grantee of the sum of $12.53 delinquent
taxes, penalties, interest and (Ex. 7.)

Extrinsic Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs1 Deeds.

5.

No evidence was introduced which would tie any of the deeds
introduced by Plaintiffs to the subject property.

Exhibits

4-7

were admitted into evidence under the Stipulation that they were
authentic but that the Court would determine what, if anything,
they conveyed.

(TR. 31-32.)

Both Mr. Pace and Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven
Martin testified that they had examined the records of Summit
County dating back to the early 1900's (TR. 179-180) and that it
was, and is, a common practice of Summit County to separately
assess and tax real properly and improvements constructed on real
property if the improvements and real property were separately
owned.

(TR 179-180, 200-201.)

Mr. Pace testified that if taxes

became delinquent on the separately owned improvements, Summit
County would treat the improvements the same as real property and
conduct a tax sale and issue a tax deed to the improvements.
(TR. 189-190.)

If the improvements were not purchased at the tax

sale Summit County would purchase the improvements later and
issue a Quit Claim Deed to the improvements to a subsequent
purchaser.

(TR. 193-194.)

The intent was to sell the

improvements only and not disturb the ownership of the underlying
real property.

(TR. 182.)
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Former Summit County Clerk/Auditor Reed Pace testified that
the 1963 tax deed (Ex. 7) executed by him was a deed solely to
improvements and not a deed to any underlying property (TR. 184186) , and that the grantee, Charles Rolfe, had purposely not paid
taxes assessed against the same improvements in order to obtain a
tax deed from Summit County to strengthen his claim of title.
(TR. 183-184.)

6.

State's Deeds and Chain of Title.

The Trial Court found and the Court of Appeals affirmed that
the State had superior title based on the following chain of
recorded deeds:

1.

A patent from the United States government to
George Snyder on April 5, 1882. (Ex. 27.)

2.

A warranty deed from George Snyder to the
Park City Smelting Company, dated November
14, 1883. (Ex. 28.)

3.

An indenture deed from the Park City Smelting
Company to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H.
Hollister on September 21, 1912. The deed
did not contain a metes and bounds
description, but described the conveyed
property as "all of the real property or
rights or interest in real property belonging
to the Park City Smelting Company and
situated in the County of Summit, Utah."
(Ex. 29.)

4.

A deed from the executors of Lewis H.
Withey f s estate to Silver King Coalition
Mines Company on November 5, 1926. The deed
did not have a metes and bounds description,
but conveyed "all the estate, right, title,
interest, property, claim and demand
9

whatsoever of the said Lewis H. Withey . . .
(of) the property above described." (Ex.
30.)
5.

A trustee's deed from Clay Hollister,
Withey's tenant in common, to Silver King
Coalition Mines on February 18, 1927. The
deed did not contain a metes and bounds
description but described the property as
"all other real property or rights or
interests in real property . . . belonging to
Park City Smelting Company, and situated in
the County of Summit, State of Utah." (Ex.
31.)

6.

A deed from Silver King Coalition Mines
Company to United Park City Mines Company,
dated May 8, 1953. (Ex. 32.)

7.

A deed from United Park City Mines Company to
Park City, dated April 2, 1969. (Ex. 33.)

8.

A deed from Park City to the State of Utah,
dated June 7, 1982. (Ex. 34.)

The patent from the United States (Ex. 27) contains a legal
description undisputedly encompassing the subject property (TR.
129-130.) (Ex. 25.)

The conveyance from George Snyder to Park

City Smelting (Ex. 28) likewise described a parcel of real
property which contained the subject property.

(TR. 131-132.)

(Ex. 25.)
While the deed from Park City Smelting to Withey and
Hollister (Ex. 29), and the deeds from Withey and Hollister to
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. (Exs. 30 and 31) did not contain
a metes and bounds description, they did have general grant
clauses conveying all property owned by the grantor in Summit
County.

All other deeds in the state's chain of title (Exs. 32,

10

33 and 34) contain metes and bounds descriptions which include
the subject property.

7.

(TR. 147, 149-150.) (Ex. 25.)

Demolition of Shack.

In 1981, Deer Valley Resort Company was installing a water
line leading to its resort.

In the water lines pathway were a

number of derelict and abandoned buildings.

Deer Valley's

pipeline contractor, Lloyd Brothers Construction Company, applied
for and received a demolition permit from Park City.

(Ex. 38.)

Lloyd Brothers1 subcontractor then tore down the abandoned
buildings, including the shack for which Plaintiffs claim
damages.

(TR. Vol. 2, 7-8.)

On its permit application, Deer Valley's Contractor, Lloyd
Brothers, represented that it had authority from the owner to
demolish those buildings (TR. 96), and Park City relied upon that
representation in issuing the permit.

(TR. 96.)

Park City never

ordered the destruction of the shack.

(TR. 120-121.)

Park City

had no other involvement with the destruction of the shack.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs brought an action claiming their father and
grandfather, both deceased, had gained title to the subject
property.

The theories under which Plaintiffs claimed were

superior title, adverse possession, prescriptive easement and
11

boundary by acquiescence.

Plaintiffs also claimed damages for

destruction of a shack on the subject property.
At the trial, the State was able to prove an unbroken chain
of title from the granting of a patent by the United States.
This chain of title is superior to the claimed title of the
Plaintiffs who rely on four disconnected Quit Claim deeds for
their "chain" of title.
Plaintiffs1 deeds fail to create any chain of title and are
defective in failing to contain any locatable description.
Additionally, three of the deeds purport to be from Summit County
pursuant to tax sales.

An examination of the law surrounding tax

deeds reveals that one who had a duty to pay taxes cannot
strengthen his title through nonpayment of taxes and receiving a
tax deed.

Alternatively, tax deeds cannot be a link in a chain

of title, but create a new title.

Therefore, the latest of the

tax deeds, issued in 1963, either created a new title or added
nothing, as did the other deeds from Summit County to Plaintiffs1
title based on a 1906 Quit Claim deed.

The 1906 deed is nothing

more than a wild deed since it cannot be connected to any other
grantee or grantor.
If the 1963 tax deed created a new title, this title is only
to the improvements described in the deed, since the State's
predecessors paid all taxes on the subject property from 19 31 to
1969.
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Plaintiffs1 claim to the property by adverse possession also
fails.

Plaintiffs were unable to show any seven-year period

where taxes were paid by them or their claimed predecessors.
Also, the trial court, on evidence presented, found the use of
the property to be permissive and not adverse.
Similarly, the prescriptive easement claim is an attempt to
misuse the doctrine to obtain all of the attributes of title.
Finally, the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that the
shack was torn down by a third party acting independently and not
the defendants.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS PLAINTIFFS

The District Court ruled and the Court of Appeals affirmed
that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5 (1987) barred Plaintiffs.

This

statute of limitation requires possession or seizure of real
property within seven years in order to bring an action for
recovery of the real property.
Plaintiffs' own witnesses testified that their claimed
possession of the subject property ceased in 1964, more than 18
years prior to bringing the action.

(TR. 66-67.)

Similarly, the

deeds by which Plaintiffs could claim seizure of the subject
property fail to describe the subject property.

13

(Ex. 4, 5, 6,

7.)

No evidence was offered at the trial which tie Plaintiffs'

deeds in any way to the subject property.

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROPERLY RAISE ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Even assuming, arguendo, that deeds introduced by Plaintiffs
relate in some way to the subject property, Plaintiffs1 claim
that §78-12-5.1, Utah Code Ann. (1987) bars the State is
meritless.
At the outset it should be noted that Plaintiffs never pled
§78-12-5.1 Utah Code Ann.

TR. 12-15), and never asserted it

until arguing it at the conclusion of the trial. (TR. Vol. 2, p.
31.)

Generally, failure to plead a statute of limitations

pursuant to Rule 8, URCP, waives the statute, Staker v.
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983).

In

circumstances where no responsive pleading is allowed, a slightly
more liberal standard requiring the party asserting the statute
must "do all he [can] to assert the statute" was adopted in
Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d, 310 283 P.2d 884, 887 (1955).

Under

either standard, Plaintiffs failed to properly assert §78-12-5.1,
Utah Code Ann. (1987) and have waived any reliance on §78-12-5.1,
Utah Code Ann. (1987).
Even if Plaintiffs had properly raised the statute of
limitation found in §78-12-5.1, it is inapplicable.

Depending

upon which deed fits Plaintiffs1 purposes, Plaintiffs contend
14

that a 1914 Quit Claim Deed issued to William Rolfe after a tax
sale, a 1917 Quit Claim Deed issued to William Rolfe after a tax
sale, or a 1963 Tax Deed issued to Charles Rolfe evidences their
"tax title" which is protected by §78-12-5.1, Utah Code Ann.
(1987) .
In addition to the fatal defects in each of these deeds
which will be discussed below, there is an inherent flaw in an
argument which contends that three separate "tax" deeds, all from
Summit County, are all viable.
The Plaintiffs1 claim that the muniments of their title are
found in a 1906 Quit Claim Deed from Belle McPollum.

(Ex. 4 ) .

This deed predates the three "tax" deeds from Summit County.

If

Plaintiff's predecessors had title under the 1906 deed from
McPollum, obviously these predecessors had a duty to pay the
property taxes.

The issuance of tax deeds or Quit Claim deeds

after a tax sale by Summit County in 1914, 1917 and 1963 evidence
one of the following:

(1)

an attempt by these predecessors to

misuse the property taxation and enforcement system to boot-strap
themselves into a better title by failing to pay their taxes; or,
(2) each successive tax deed created a new and distinct chain of
title and the plaintiffs must claim title solely through the 1963
tax deed (Ex. 7 ) , the last tax deed issued by Summit County.

The

1917 deed, (Ex. 6 ) , on its face states that the taxes had been
previously assessed in 1912 to William Rolfe, the Grantee, who
obviously owed taxes prior to 1914 and failed to pay them.

The

testimony of retired County Treasurer Reed Pace, who executed the
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1963 deed, (Ex. 7 ) , was that Charles Rolfe, the Grantee, was the
person who owed the taxes on the "house in lumberyard11 for which
the 1963 tax deed, (Ex. 7 ) , was issued.

Mr. Rolfe purposely

failed and refused to pay the taxes in order to obtain a tax deed
to the house in the lumber yard.

(TR. 183-184.)

The purpose of

such a strategy is obviously to strengthen a weak claim of title.
In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 1982), this
Court held that:

"One who is under an obligation to pay taxes on

land cannot be allowed to strengthen his title to such land by
buying in the tax title when the property is sold as a
consequence of his omission to pay taxes."

This Court in Dillman

specifically held that one who purchases at a tax sale whose duty
it was to pay those taxes gains nothing except the release of the
lien for nonpayment of taxes.

The Plaintiffs are urging this

Court to overrule Dillman and rule that their claimed
predecessors who failed to pay their taxes be rewarded with
something more than the release of the county's lien.

This Court

has already rejected this spurious argument.
This Court in Dillman also refused to apply the special
statute of limitations found in §78-12-5.I1 to situations
identical to the instant one.

This Court observed that the

policy behind this statute to give stability to tax titles should
not be extended to one who has a duty to pay taxes and is simply

The Utah Supreme Court also refused to apply the special
statute of limitations for tax titles in a situation where one
tenant in common had obtained a tax deed in Massev v. Prothero,
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1982).
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attempting to misuse the tax enforcement and collection system.
The rule in Dillman prevents exactly the type of activity engaged
in by Plaintiffs1 claimed predecessors, of attempting to clothe
themselves with a title, and a limitation on the attack of the
title, by willfully failing to pay property taxes.
Alternatively, if the "tax title" deeds from Summit County
are more than void attempts at bootstrapping a title by those
having a duty to pay taxes, prohibited by Dillman, then the 19 63
tax deed, (Ex. 7 ) , created a new title.

In Tuft v. Federal

Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982) this Court affirmed the rule
in Utah that a tax deed creates a new and paramount title and
which totally destroys the prior title to the property.

See also

Dillman.
Assuming that the 1963 tax deed, (Ex. 7 ) , created a "tax
title," an examination of this "tax title" and whether it is
entitled to protection from §78-12-5.1 Utah Code Ann. (1987) is
in order.
First, if such a "tax title" were protected from question by
§78-12-5.1, Utah Code Ann. (1987) the state and its predecessors
would be denied their due process of law.

In 1983, the United

States Supreme Court in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 4 62
U.S. 791 (1983), ruled that a tax foreclosure and sale was void
for denial of due process of law if all lienholders did not
receive actual prior notice of the foreclosure proceeding.

In

applying the Mennonite holding to an identical situation
involving a statute of limitations, the Third Circuit held in
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Benoit v. Pathaky, 780 F.2d 336 (3rd Cir. 1985), that failure to
give constitutionally sufficient notice was a jurisdictional
defect which rendered inapplicable the special tax title statute
of limitations.
In the instant matter, what notice or what tax foreclosure
proceedings, if any, were held and given at the turn of the
century, is unknown.

However, it was clearly established at the

trial that State's predecessor and grantor, United Park City
Mines Company, had no notice of any tax sale in 1963 which would
affect its title (if it were to convey the underlying property)
to the subject property since it paid property taxes without
fail, on the subject property every single year from 1954 to
1969.
Second, even if the deeds through which Plaintiffs claim are
shielded by virtue of Utah Code Ann. (1987), §78-12-5.1, the
unassailable title is, at best, to improvements only since that
is all Summit County had obtained and all that the deeds describe
and convey.

According to Harman v. Polter, 592 P.2d 653 (Utah

1979), the description in a deed is prima facie evidence of the
intent of the grantor in what is conveyed by the deed.

All

evidence at trial supported the prima facie presumption that
Summit County only intended to convey improvements through the
three deeds issued by it and not any real property, which Summit
County had no title to anyway.
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POINT III
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ADVERSE POSSESSION

Plaintiffs have misconstrued the case of Parkwest Village,
Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) in asserting that the
Trial and Appellate Court erred in dismissing their claim to the
subject property by Adverse Possession under Utah Code Annotated
§78-12-10, et seq.

As will be discussed below, Avise is

factual y distinguishable and inapplicable.
In order to obtain the subject property by Adverse
Possession, the Plaintiffs must prove that they have complied
precisely with all of the requirements for adverse possession
found in Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-10, et seq., (1987).

The

Court in Home Owners1 Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160,
166 (Utah 1943), held that the party claiming adverse possession
"has the burden of pleading and proving full compliance with the
statute."

This holding was reaffirmed in Neeley v. Kelsch, 600

P.2d 979 (Utah 1979), and most recently by this Court in United
Park City Mines Co. v. Estate of Clegg, 727 P.2d 173 (Utah,
1987), where this Court held:

"One who seeks to acquire title to

real property other than by conveyance must comply precisely with
the statutory requirements for doing so."

(Emphasis added.)

The statutory elements of Adverse Possession are:
1.

Possess land in the statutorily prescribed
manner, for the statutory period of seven
years;

2.

Hold the land adversely to title holder;
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3.

Pay all taxes legally assessed against the
land for the seven year period.

It is undisputed that a failure to comply precisely with the
requirements of a single element of adverse possession causes the
claim of adverse possession to fail completely.

A.

Plaintiffs Cannot Show Payment of All Taxes Legally
Assessed Against the Land for any Seven-Year Period.

Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-12, 1953 as amended, requires
that "the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all
taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land
according to law."

(Emphasis added.)

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the
requirement of payment of all taxes is a mandatory requirement,
which if not proven by the party claiming adverse possession,
will completely defeat his claim.

The Court explained this

requirement in its ruling in Home Owners' Loan Corporation v.
Dudley, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (Utah 1943), stating:

"An adverse

claimant has the duty of pleading and proving full compliance
with the statute, including payment of all taxes lawfully
assessed. . . ."2
Prior to 1931, no evidence of payment of taxes on the
subject property by anyone

was available.

Deputy Summit County

Assessor Steven Martin was simply unable to locate records of

See also Neelev v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979).
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payment of taxes on the subject property prior to 1931. The two
ancient quit claim deeds issued by Summit County (Ex. 5, 6),
which Plaintiffs cite as proof of tax payment, only recite that
consideration paid was $28.68 and $1.00, respectively.

No

evidence was offered that such consideration had any relationship
whatsoever to any taxes assessed.

There was no evidence as to

what years of taxes the consideration represented.

The deeds are

entitled Quit Claim deeds, probably issued after a tax sale found
no buyers.

Plaintiffs1 bald assertion claim that Mr. Rolfe paid

all taxes between 1910 and 1931 is simply not supported by the
record.

During the pre-1931 period, there is no record of any

tax payment by anyone.

If Plaintiffs are attempting to rely on

the consideration recited in the Quit Claim deeds, their reliance
is misplaced.

In Bowen v. Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 168 P.2d 983

(1954), this Court ruled that redeeming property at a tax sale or
purchasing property at a tax sale does not constitute the payment
of taxes necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for
adverse possession.

Thus any redemption or purchase from Summit

County by Plaintiffs1 predecessors could not possibly satisfy the
requirement that taxes be paid for a minimum of seven years by
the party claiming adverse possession.3
From 1931 to 1969, the State's predecessors and not the
Plaintiffs' predecessors paid all real property taxes on the

See also Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co., 107 P.2d 170 (Utah
194 0), where the Supreme Court also held that redemption at a tax
sale did not constitute payment of taxes required under adverse
possession.
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subject property,

A letter from then County Treasurer Reed Pace,

dated May 16, 1957, (Ex.13), reveals that Plaintiff's predecessor
did not pay any taxes whatsoever for the period of 194 0-1955 and
Plaintiffs themselves admitted to no knowledge of payment of any
taxes prior to 1966 and only claimed payment in 1982 and one
other year before 1982 and after 1966.
Thus, at trial Plaintiffs simply failed to meet their burden
by failing to show payment of all taxes assessed for any seven
year period, and thereby failed to meet the requirements of Utah
Code Annotated, §78-12-12, 1953, as amended.

In Neelev v.

Kelsch, 600 F.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979), this Court held:

This Court has held an adverse claimant has the burden
of proving full statutory compliance, including the
payment of all taxes assessed. Kelsch testified that
he did not know whether or not he had paid taxes on the
disputed property, and he did not present any evidence
of the payment of taxes. Since Kelsch did not carry
his burden of proof, the Trial Court erred in holding
adverse possession as an alternative basis for Quieting
Title in Kelsch.
Similarly, Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof
and the trial Court and Utah Court of Appeals correctly so ruled
on this factual issue.
Plaintiffs1 heavy reliance on the opinion in Parkwest
Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) is misplaced.

In

Avise, this Court recognized the Summit County practice of
separately assessing and taxing improvements and real property.
While the adverse possessor was able to show payment of taxes by
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his predecessors for a period in excess of 2 3 years on the
improvements, there was no evidence that taxes were even levied
and assessed on the underlying real property prior to 1975. This
Court ruled that until 1975 the adverse possessor's predecessors
paid all taxes that were levied and assessed, since no other
taxes were levied and assessed.

Similarly, the successful

adverse possessor in Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104
(Utah 1987), paid all taxes assessed and levied on the surface
estate or improvements for a seventeen-year period.
Conversely in the instant matter, the County records show
assessment and levying of taxes on the underlying property from
1931 until the property became tax exempt in 1970. These taxes
were paid every one of those years by the predecessors of the
State.

In order for Plaintiffs to be aided by the decision in

Avise, they must demonstrate payment of all taxes that were
levied and assessed on the subject property for a seven-year
period.

There is no holding or suggestion in Avise that the

Adverse Possessor is relieved from his absolute statutory duty to
prove payment of all taxes assessed for seven consecutive years.4
Clearly the failure by the Plaintiffs to identify and prove
payment of all taxes levied and assessed for any seven year
period precludes them from obtaining the subject property by
adverse possession.

Even if Plaintiff could prove payment of

Plaintiffs' citation of Affleck v. Morgan, 12 Utah 2d.
200, 364 P.2d 663 (1961), and Houghton v. Barton, 49 Utah 611,
165 P. 471 (1917) is not helpful to this Court since those cases
are factually distinguishable.
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taxes for the required seven year period on improvements, such
payment period must coincide with a period when no other taxes
were levied and assessed.
The purpose behind the statutory requirement of payment of
all taxes by the party claiming adverse possession is to put the
true owner on notice that his land is being adversely claimed.
This purpose is stated in Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d
983 (1954).

The true owner does not obtain notice during the

years the party claiming adverse possession does not pay the
taxes with a hidden motive of purchase at a future tax sale.
Additionally, there is no identifiable location of the
improvements on which Plaintiffs claimed to have paid taxes.

The

absence of any description sufficient to locate the improvements
assessed is insufficient to put the State or its predecessors on
notice of any adverse claim as required by Bowen.

B.

Plaintiffs Did Not Possess the Subject Property.

The requirements for establishing of "possession" depend on
whether the adverse claimant is claiming under color of title or
not.

Color of title is not necessary, but it makes the element

of possession easier to meet for the adverse claimant.

Claiming

under color of title also affects the amount of land which can be
secured by possessory activities.
Plaintiffs, through their complaint, have not claimed
Adverse Possession under color of title, but only claimed under
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the non-color of title section.

(See Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff!s

Amended Complaint.)
Plaintiffs, as adverse claimants without color of title, may
establish possession only through the possessory activities found
in Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-11 (1987).

(This Section has been

in effect and remains substantially unchanged since 1872.)

The

adverse claimant without color of title can thus only acquire the
land actually enclosed, cultivated, improved, or irrigated.

The

statutory language allows claiming "the land so actually occupied
and no other, is deemed to have been held adversely."
Annotated, §78-12-10, 1953 as amended.

Utah Code

The adverse claimant

without color of title does not have the benefit of the statutory
section applicable to those who claim with color of title.

Utah

Code Ann., §78-12-9(4), 1953 as amended.
Since 1964, Plaintiffs have failed to reach the minimum
threshold of possession under either color or non-color of title.
The testimony of all witnesses at trial, upon which the Court
ruled the property was abandoned by Plaintiffs, was that
Plaintiffs neither lived in or rented the subject property and
only occasionally visited the property allowing it to deteriorate
and become overgrown with brush and weeds.

There were no fences

or defined yard and no sign of any cultivation or improvements.
Additionally, the activities of Plaintiffs failed to "give actual
or constructive notice to the legal title holder . . .
[sufficient] to give a reasonably prudent title holder notice of
the claimant's intention."

Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587
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(Utah 1982) .5

In order for conduct alone to give such notice,

"it must be conduct that is inconsistent with the rights of the
owner."

Olwell at 587.

In Pender v. Jackson. 123 Utah 501, 260

P.2d 542, (1953), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that holding land
for speculation was not a use sufficient to meet the requirements
of adverse possession.

The Court stated:

Merely holding land for speculation is the purpose for
which the land is held and not use of the land; we are
not disposed to distort the phrase "ordinary use of the
occupant" to a point beyond meaning. This is true even
though a landowner is cognizant of the facts and the
adverse claim became the necessary element of
occupation, as defined by the Utah Statute, is not
established.
This Court in Pender cited with approval its earlier
decision in Day v. Steele. Ill Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947),
where surveying of the property erecting tie posts in corners,
clearing greasewood from the property, placing a sign on the
property, allowing a carnival to use a small portion of the
property for a week, and placing fill dirt on the property were
all cumulatively held to be insufficient to possess the property
under the lesser standard of the color of title statute.6
The possessory activities must continuously be of the
character necessary under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-9 or §78-12-11.
The adverse claimant need not occupy the land constantly in order

See also Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah
1982).
6

See also Powell on Real Property, §1018, pg. 739.
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to occupy it "continuously", but the adverse claimant's
possession may not be sporadic.

In determining what is

"continuous" and what is "sporadic" the character of the land and
the type of use to which it is being put are important.

In the

instant matter, the subject property is residential in character.
Therefore, the complete failure to occupy the property since 19 64
constitutes something less than "sporadic" possession and
destroys Plaintiffs1 ability to claim ripening of adverse
possession during this period,7

C.

Plaintiffs1 Use of the Real Property Was Permissive,
Not Adverse.

In Utah, "[t]o acquire title by adverse possession. . . the
possession [must be] with an intention on the part of the
claimant to claim title as owner and against the rights of the
true owner."8

Since intent is generally unstated, it must be

inferred from the possessory acts.

The intent to claim title

Even if Plaintiffs could show possession of the subject
property during the past 1964 period, the window of opportunity
for adverse possession closed in 1969. In 1969 the subject
property was obtained by Park City, a political subdivision of
the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §78-122-13 (1986) prohibits
property held by any city for a public purpose to be obtained by
adverse possession.
8

Montgomery Adverse Possession of Land Titles in Utah, 3
Utah Law Review 294, at 309 (quoting Dianan v. Nelson, 72 P. 936,
937 (Utah 903).
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will be inferred

fl

[w]henever the possession is of such a

character that ownership may be inferred."9
In the instant matter, the testimony at trial was that it
was a common practice of mining companies in Park City to permit
miners to build homes on mining company property.

(TR. 157.)

The statefs predecessors in interest, Silver King Coalition Mine
Company (1927-1953) and United Park City Mine Company (19531969), both permitted the use of their property, including the
subject property, by employees and others to erect homes and live
there.

(Tr. 174.)

Plaintiff Merle Anderson testified and

Exhibit 15 showed that Plaintiff's father worked for Jim Ivers.
(TR. 71.)

It was also established at the trial that Jim Ivers

was either president or owner of Silver King Coalition Mine
Company.

(TR. 175.)

The 1906 deed (Ex. 4), by which Plaintiffs

claim title, recognizes the permissive use of the underlying real
property by referring to "privileges" in the land.

Based on this

evidence the trial court ruled and the Court of Appeals affirmed
that the use of the subject property by Plaintiffs1 claimed
predecessor was permissive.

Plaintiffs introduced no evidence

that the use of the subject property by their claimed predecessor
was adverse rather than permissive.
This Court should view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court and the findings of
the trial court should not be disturbed unless there is no

Montgomery at 309 (quoting Pioneer Investment & Trust Co.
v. Board of Education, 99 P. 150,152 (Utah 1909).
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substantial record evidence to support them.

Harline v.

Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1926).
Once it is established a use was initially permissive, the
inference and burden of proof of the adverse nature of the use
shifts back to the adverse claimant to show that the use somehow
became adverse.

In Richens v. Struhs. Utah 2d 356 (1966), 412

P.2d 314 17, the shifting of the burden is enunciated.

The Court

reasoned that unless the person claiming adverse possession could
show that the use became adverse he would be allowed to "sneak up
on the owner by using his property under permission and then
after a lapse of time claim he was using it as a matter of
right."

(At 316.)

Plaintiffs1 claim of adverse possession falls

precisely into the category of behavior proscribed by Richins.

POINT IV
COURT OF APPEALS PROPERTY AFFIRMED
THAT MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
DID NOT APPLY TO PLAINTIFF-APPLICANTS
Plaintiffs assert that the Marketable Record Title Act, Utah
Code Ann. §57-9-1 through -10, insulates their "title" from
challenge by Park City or the State of Utah.

This is based upon

a total misreading of the Marketable Record Title Act.

In fact,

said Act insulates the title that was obtained by Park City and
conveyed to the State of Utah.
The Act required "an unbroken chain of title of record to
any interest in land for forty years or more . . . ".
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§57-9-1,

Utah Code Ann. (1986).

(Emphasis added.)

An unbroken chain of

title is defined in §57-9-1 as when the recorded conveyances
relied upon create an interest in (1) the person claiming such
interest, or (2) some other person from whom, by one or more
conveyances or other title transactions of record, such purported
interest has become vested in the person claiming such interest.
Plaintiffs appear to be relying upon two instruments, one
being a Quit Claim tax deed issued in 1914 and another being a
Quit Claim tax deed issued in 1917.

The 1914 deed was a Quit

Claim deed resulting from a tax sale and conveyed "Improvements
East U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah.

(Ex. 5 ) . The 1917 deed had a

different
description of the improvements being "That certain frame
dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Summit County, Utah,
assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912.

(Ex. 6.)

Neither of these deeds conveyed the underlying real
property, but only the improvements.

The Marketable Record Title

Act would offer no protection for the underlying real estate for
this reason alone.

The cases cited by Plaintiffs are "land"

cases and are not analogous.

For instance, in Baker v. Goodman,

57 Utah 379, 194 P.2d 117 (1920), a tax deed was found sufficient
to give color of title.

But the tax deed in that case was for

"land" and is therefore not analogous to this case.

Defendants

do not contest that Plaintiffs' predecessors owned the
improvements.

The subject tax deeds cannot give color of title

to property (the land) that is beyond the description of the tax
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deeds.

Therefore, the Baker case was improperly applied by the

Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs cite Falcenaro Enterprises v. Valaley
Investment Co., 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P.2d 915 (1974), for the
proposition that their tax deeds and possession provided actual
notice.

This is also absurd.

The tax deeds only gave notice of

an interest in improvements, not the underlying real property.
The possession also was consistent with employee ownership of the
improvements and a mining company owning the underlying property.
Not only do Plaintiffs fail to show compliance with the
Marketable Record Title act by not having root deeds to the
"land", but also fail to show "an unbroken chain of title" for at
least forty years.

There are no subsequent conveyances from

William Rolfe to anyone else, including the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs clearly cannot meet this requirement to invoke the
Act.

Additionally, there are recorded conveyances in the State's

chain of title in 1926, 1927, 1953, 1969, and 1982, which purport
to divest the Plaintiffs of any interest in the subject property.
(Exs. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34.)
±t is entirely fallacious for the Plaintiffs to be
challenging the District Court decision and the affirming thereof
by the Utah Court of Appeals by relying upon the Marketable
Record Title Act, because the Act protects the title obtained by
Park City and conveyed to the State of Utah.
The State's title is rooted in the patent issued by the
United States Government on April 5, 1882, to George Snyder which
31

indisputably includes the subject property.

(Ex. 25 and Ex. 27.)

The patent on its face, indicates that it was duly recorded in
the records of the Summit County Recorder.
On November 14, 1883, George Snyder conveyed, by Warranty
Deed, a portion of the real property acquired by said patent,
which also indisputably contains the subject property, to the
Park City Smelting Company.

(Ex. 25 and Ex. 28.)

This deed was

also recorded in the records of the Summit County Recorder.

(Ex.

28.)
On November 21, 1912, the Park City Smelting Company
conveyed title to all of their property in Summit County, by
Indenture Deed, to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister.
29).

(Ex.

This deed was also duly recorded in the records of the

Summit County Recorder.

(Ex. 29.)

On November 5, 1926, the executors of the Last Will of Lewis
H. Withey, deceased, a tenant in common with Clay H. Hollister,
conveyed, by Deed, Withey1s interest to Silver King Coalition
Mines Company.

(Ex. 3 0.)

On February 5, 1927, Clay H. Hollister conveyed, by deed, to
Silver King Coalition Mines Company.

This deed was recorded in

the records of the Summit County Recorder.

(Ex. 31.)

At this point, the Marketable Record Title Act, having had
forty years of record title already pass, protects the title of
the State's predecessors.
1953 as amended.

Section 57-9-3, Utah Code Annotated,

Nevertheless, through a series of duly recorded
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deeds, title passed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to
the State of Utah.

(Exs. 32, 33, and 34.)

It is therefore the State that has the more than forty years
of continuous record title which should be protected by the Act
from the challenge of the Plaintiffs.

The Act never intended to

pass title beyond the description of the root deed.

Therefore,

the Utah Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court
decision by not granting the Plaintiffs relief (ownership of the
underlying property) under said Act.

POINT V
THE DOCTRINE OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO ADVERSE POSSESSION
Plaintiffs have claimed a prescriptive easement as the alter
ego of adverse possession.

Plaintiffs would have this Court rule

that if a person seeking adverse possession fails to establish
the elements for adverse possession, he may obtain all of the
attributes of ownership by prescriptive easement.

In other

words, Plaintiffs are attempting to gain title to the subject
property prescriptively without proving all of the elements
necessary to gain title by adverse possession.

An easement of

the scope claimed by Plaintiffs is actually not an easement at
all; it is a fee simple interest.
An easement, as distinguished from ownership, is a mere
right to use the land of another for a limited purpose.

This

Court has described the interlocking interests of owner and
33

easement holder created by the existence of an easement in the
following terms:

Whenever there is ownership of property subject to an
easement there is a dichotomy of interests, both of
which must be represented and kept in balance. On the
one hand, it is to be realized that the owner of the
fee title, because of his general ownership, should
have the use and enjoyment of his property to the
highest degree possible, not inconsistent with the
easement. One the other, the owner of the easement
should likewise have the right to use and enjoy his
easement to the fullest extent possible not
inconsistent with the rights of the fee owner.

North Union Canal Company v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah
1976) (citations omitted).10

This formulation of balanced rights

assumes that the owner of the servient tenement retains some
rights in the land.

The extent of the "easement" claimed by

Plaintiffs leaves no rights to the fee owner, the State.
The concept of "easement" clearly addresses use, as
distinguished from occupation and enjoyment of land.

While this

Court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the nature of
this distinction, the distinction has been recognized by Courts
throughout the nation.

The Utah Court of Appeals recognized this

distinction in its opinion in this matter and the Illinois
Supreme Court observed:
There are . . . rights to be exercised in connection
with corporal things but without any ownership,
possession, control or power of disposition of the
,u

See also United States v. O1Block, 788 F.2d 1433 (10th
Cir. 1986).
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thing in connection with which the power may be
exercised and without any profit therein, such as a
right to pass over another's land; . . . These are
easements which consist in the right of the owner of
one parcel of land, by reason of such ownership, to use
the land of another for a special purpose not
inconsistent with the general property in the owner,
and these are always distinct from the occupation and
enjoyment of the land itself. [Citations omitted.]
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emerson, 131 N.E. 645, 648 (111.
1921) .
Our neighboring jurisdiction of Colorado described the
limits of the extent of easement rights as follows:

"[WJhile

plaintiff had obtained an easement by prescription, it had not
acquired title to the land over which it flows.

The easement,

therefor, should not work a dispossession of the landowner."
Osborn & Claywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo.
1983).

(Emphasis added.)11

Plaintiffs1 claimed "easement" over the subject property is
essentially inconsistent with both the "general ownership,"
(North Union Canal at 179), of the fee owner and the "use and
enjoyment," (Id. at 179), pursuant thereto that the Utah Supreme
Court contemplates in its concept of an "easement."
179. ) 1 2

(Id. at

Plaintiffs claim the right to the exclusive use and

The West Virginia and Missouri Courts are also in
accord. See Ballanges v. Becklev Coal & Supply Co., 161 S.E.
562, 563 (W. Va. 1931); and St. Louis County v. St. Appalonia
Corp., 471 S.W. 2d 238, 246 (Mo. 1971).
12

See also Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah
1982); McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978); Flying
Diamond v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976).
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enjoyment of the entire surface.

Plaintiffs claim the right to

alienate, devise and assign that right of exclusive use.
Plaintiffs claim the right to profit from the land by leasing
that right of exclusive use to others.

Plaintiffs claim the

right to maintain a dwelling on the land and to use the land as
they see fit without regard to the fee owner's interests.

The

sum of the rights claimed by Plaintiffs leaves nothing to the
State that can qualify as a "general ownership."
In short, Plaintiffs are seeking ownership of the property
in dispute through a misapplication of the Prescriptive Easement
Doctrine.

The result urged by Plaintiffs has never been reached

by any Court in Utah or the nation.

The granting of such a

prescriptive easement would also subvert adverse possession and
violate the public policy behind the requirement of payment of
taxes so as to put the record owner on notice.
Qlsen, 2 Utah 2d, 268 P.2d 983 (1954).

See Bowen v.

If this Court adopts the

application of Prescriptive easements urged by Plaintiffs, the
requirement of payment of taxes in Utah Code Ann., §78-12-12
(1987), would be rendered meaningless.
The cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their claim of
prescriptive easement are all factually distinguishable and
inapplicable to the instant matter.
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POINT VI
PLAINTIFFS DEEDS ARE NULL AND VOID

Plaintiffs rely on four deeds through which they claimed
title to the subject property.

(Exhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7.)

A

common element of all of Plaintiffs' deeds is the complete
absence of any locatable description of real property.

The Trial

Court specifically found and the Court of Appeals affirmed that
all deeds upon which the Plaintiffs rely were void for lack of a
description by which the property to be conveyed could be located
or even identified.

(Rec. 368.)

It is well-settled Utah law that fla deed must contain a
sufficiently definite description to identify the property it
conveys".

Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 305 (Utah 1976).

If, after applying the rules of construction which are generally
applicable to controversies over the meaning of documents to the
deed in question, the Court is still unable to identify the
property the deed is attempting to convey, then the deed is null
and void.
While the Utah Supreme Court has upheld descriptions in
option agreements which identified the property by street address
in Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986),
and Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), the descriptions in
the Plaintiffs1 deeds do not contain even a street address to
identify any specific property.

The opportunity to resort to

reasonable inferences and extrinsic evidence at the trial as
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prescribed in Colman, did not yield any clue as to the
relationship, if any, between the improvements referred to in the
plaintiffs deeds and the subject property.
The lack of any description in these deeds sufficient to
locate or identify the property to be conveyed distinguishes
these deeds from the deed in Colman.

The use of commonly

employed abbreviations in the legal description in the Colman
deed was not fatal because there was "a sound basis for the trial
courts conclusion that the description in the deed was
sufficiently definite to convey the property in question."
(Colman at 505.)

The trial court was not able to make any such

conclusion in the instant matter.

The only testimony regarding

Plaintiffs1 deeds given at trial was that the Plaintiffs found
the deeds among papers at their mothers1 or fathers1 homes or
among their families1 legal documents.

(TR. 34, 3 6.)

No

testimony was given which could have assisted the Court in
relating the deeds offered by Plaintiffs to any parcel of real
property.

With no parol evidence which would assist the Court in

fixing the location of the ambiguous and uncertain descriptions
in the deeds, the Court's only alternative was to rule that the
deeds, upon which Plaintiffs rely, were void for lack of
descriptions.
It should also be noted that in Utah deeds are held to a
higher standard in contrast with other documents such as options.
In Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 407, 367 P.2d 193, (1952), this
Court held that a warranty deed was a nullity simply because the
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deed's description failed to close on the fifth and sixth
courses.

The deeds on which the Plaintiffs1 reply in the instant

matter do not even contain an identifiable description of real
property.

The Court in Howard held:

Either it is impossible to determine what Howard had in
mind or, conjecture indulged one would have to divine
that any number of areas could be said to have been
intended. In such case, abstractors and lawyers should
be able to turn down a title based on the contentions
of such an illusory intention of a deceased. (at 195).
It is clearly beyond dispute that if a deed with a defective
legal description is fatally deficient, then the Plaintiffs1
deeds with no locatable or identifiable legal descriptions and no
clue as to the Grantors1 intent, are even more fatally deficient.
The only party to the 1963 Deed, (Ex. 7), who testified is
retired Summit County Auditor Reed Pace. Mr. Pace's testimony
was that the deed he executed (Ex. 7) conveyed title only to the
improvements described in the deed and not to any underlying real
property.

Mr. Pace further testified that he did not know the

location of the improvements referred to in the deed he executed.
The Plaintiffs in the instant matter are asking this Court
to ignore the well-founded requirement in Utah that deeds
identify the property they are to convey, and to rule that the
vague and unlocatable descriptions in the Plaintiffs' deeds are
sufficient to quiet title in the Plaintiffs to the real property
described in their Complaint.

This is clearly contrary to

settled Utah law.
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The rule in Utah, which requires a deed to contain a
description sufficient to identify the property, is well founded
and followed throughout the United States.13

Additionally, Tax

Deeds are routinely held to even higher standards of certainty of
their description than inter-party deeds.

The New Mexico Supreme

Court in Brylinski v. Cooper, 624 P.2d 522 (New Mexico 1981),
held that a description of a tax deed must describe the property
to be conveyed.

The Court refused to allow the use of extrinsic

evidence to identify the property to be conveyed.

The reason

extrinsic evidence could not be used is that tax deeds must give
notice to the foreclosed owner and the public of what particular
property is being conveyed.14

POINT VII
THE STATE HOLDS SUPERIOR TITLE

If, arguendo, the Plaintiffs1 deeds were valid, the chain of
title through which the State claims the subject real property is
still clearly the superior chain of title.
have a chain of title.

Plaintiffs do not

The Plaintiffs1 deeds are a series of

quit claim deeds, and a tax deed from Summit County.

There are

See Boone v. Pritchett, 130 Se.2d 288 (North Carolina
1963); MacKubbin v. Rosedale Memorial Park, Inc., 198 A.2d 856
(Pennsylvania 1964); See also 4 Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd Ed.
Sec. 990.
14

See also Wingard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1967)
and Yetter v. Gallatin County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982).
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no deeds from any of the Grantees to any one else, and none from
any Grantee or Grantor to any of the Plaintiffs.

There are

simply four disconnected deeds upon which the Trial Court
properly ruled and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed that
the chain of title of Plaintiffs was discontinuous.

(Rec. 368.)

In contrast, the chain of title of the State is an unbroken
chain back to the original source, the Patent issued by Chester
A. Arthur, as President of the United States.

This is a complete

and perfect chain of title as defined by this Court and no proof
of actual possession is needed.

In Music Service Corporation v.

Walton, 432 P.2d 334, 20 Utah 2d 16 (1967), the Utah Supreme
Court cited with approval Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 88
P. 696 (1907), and held that:

"Of course, where one proved a

perfect chain of paper title from its original source, no proof
of actual possession is required.

In such event the presumption

would be all sufficient and the title would be a complete and
perfect title."

(Rec. at 336.)

The only expert title abstractor who testified at trial,
Nick Butkovich, testified that State's chain of title was
superior to Plaintiffs1.

(TR. 156.)

Finally, Plaintiffs1 claim of a chain of title is further
barred by an attempt to claim tax deed(s) as part of their chain
of title.

It is settled Utah law that a tax deed either adds

nothing to title if the tax deed is obtained by the party who
actually owed the taxes, or creates a new title if the tax deed
is obtained by a third party who had no duty to pay taxes.
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This rule of law is set forth in Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d
974 (Utah 1982), and Tuft v. Federal Leasing. 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah
1982).

POINT VIII
TAXATION AND FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE BY SUMMIT COUNTY
AT BEST CONVEYED IMPROVEMENTS AND MAY BE VOID
The trial of this matter brought to light once again the
practice of Summit County to separately assess and tax
improvements from the real property upon which the improvements
were constructed if there is separate ownership.

This Court had

previously encountered this practice in Parkwest Village v.
Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986)•
Plaintiffs point out that Summit County was authorized
pursuant to Section 2 655, compiled laws of Utah, to sell Real
Estate at Tax Sales.

Real Estate is defined in Black's Law

Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, to include improvements to real
property.

Therefore, Plaintiffs argument that real estate and

real property are synonymous is not well founded.

The practice

of selling real estate, i.e., improvements, did not disturb the
underlying real property.
However, even if Plaintiffs argument is then accepted, this
practice of separately assessing improvements was illegal and
ultra-vires, this Court cannot conclude that a tax deed issued by
Summit County for improvements only passes title as well to the
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underlying real property.

Such a conclusion is prohibited by

controlling constitutional law and this Court's prior rulings.
Rather than broadly constructing the ultra-vires acts of
Summit County in tax assessment, foreclosure and sale, this Court
has uniformly held that tax assessment, foreclosure and sale
should be strictly and narrowly construed.

In Frederickson v. La

Fleur, 632 P.2d 827, 828 (Utah 1987), Justice Oaks wrote:

American courts have long looked upon tax titles with a
jaundiced eye. Like the courts of most other States,
this Court has consistently held that statutes
providing for the sale of tax delinquent lands and the
issuance of tax deeds pursuant to such sales are to be
construed narrowly and in favor of the tax debtor.
Not only are such activities to be construed narrowly and
strictly, but other jurisdictions which, unlike Utah, have had
the opportunity to rule, have consistently ruled that a tax deed
can only convey that property which was assessed and obtained for
non-payment of taxes.

In Webermier v. Pace, 552 P.2d 1021, 1024

(Colo. 1976), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that "the
grantee of a tax deed secures title to no more than that owned by
the Grantee's predecessor in title."
In Webermier, a person only owned the mineral rights to coal
in a certain parcel of real property.

This person's ownership

rights were foreclosed for non-payment of taxes and a deed was

See also Mecham v. Mel-0-Tone Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah
2d 402, 464 P.,2d 392 (1970) and Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc.,
v. Colman, 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1965).
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issued by the County after tax sale, which purported to convey
all mineral rights.

The Court held that the deed only conveyed

ownership rights to coal through the tax foreclosure and could
only convey what it had obtained.

The ownership of the other

mineral interest holders could not be disturbed and grantees of
the tax deeds had no claim to other mineral interests, regardless
of the description of the tax deed.

The Utah Court in Hayes v.

Gibb, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 731 (1946), held that only the
interest that is properly assessed is sold at a tax sale.
At most, Plaintiffs1 tax deed and quit claim deeds from
Summit County conveyed only improvements, since that was the only
ownership interest obtained by the County through tax
foreclosure.

Such deeds could not possibly disturb the

separately owned and assessed underlying real property.

Because

such taxation, foreclosure and sale of improvements was an ultra
vires act, the tax deed and quit claim deeds issued subsequent to
the tax foreclosure of the improvements are void.

Such illegal

actions of Summit County absolutely cannot now be broadly
construed to include the underlying real property.
In addition to the limitations and defects set forth above,
the Plaintiffs1 Quit Claim deeds, (Ex. 4, 5, 6 ) , have additional
legal limitations.

In Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983),

the Court held that a grantee under a quit claim deed acquires
only the interest of the grantor.

Thus, it is beyond dispute

that the Plaintiffs1 deeds at most conveyed only the improvements
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since that was all Summit County owned, and not the subject real
property.
The public policy underlying the narrow and strict
construction of the forfeiture of the property through the tax
foreclosure and sale process is grounded in the Constitutional
Prohibition against taking of property without due process of
law,16

Courts throughout the Nation have uniformly held that in

order to divest an owner of his property thought tax foreclosure,
the owner must be given actual notice prior to the proceeding and
the notice must contain a sufficient description of the property
being foreclosed to identify and locate it.17
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983), that not only
must owners receive actual notice of impending tax foreclosure,
but due process demands that all lienholders also be given actual
notice.
In the instant action, Plaintiffs would have this Court
construe a 1963 tax deed issued by Summit County describing only
improvements to include the subject real property even though the
then owner of the subject property, United Park City Mines
Company, paid all real property taxes assessed and levied on the

Amendment Five, United States Constitution which is made
applicable to actions of the State by the Fourteenth Amendment
and Article 1, Section 1, Constitution of Utah.
17

See Wenatachee Reclamation District v. Mustell, 665 P.2d
909 (Wash. App. 1983); Wincrard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash.
1967); Yetter v. Gallatin County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982)
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subject property both before and after the tax sale and obviously
had no notice of or knowledge of any foreclosure affecting its
ownership of the subject property.
The result urged by Plaintiffs would clearly deprive the
owners of the underlying real property Due Process of Law.18

POINT IX

PARK CITY NOT LIABLE FOR DESTRUCTION OF SHACK
The evidence presented at trial was that Deer Valley Resort
Company was constructing a water pipeline to its ski resort and
engaged Lloyd Brothers Construction Company as its Contractor.
There were several derelict and abandoned shacks which were in
the path of the pipeline.

Lloyd Brothers sought to demolish the

shacks which were in its way.

In Park City, as in most cities, a

permit is required from the city to either construct or demolish
a building.
These permits are issued to contractors upon the
contractor's representation that he is authorized by the property
owner to conduct the activity allowed in the permit.

The permit

does not require the contractor to act and simply expires if not
acted upon within 180 days.

The Utah Court has also held that a purported sale for
taxes when taxes were not delinquent was void and conveyed no
interest whatsoever to purchasers in Mecham v. Mel-Q-Tone
Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 403, 4364, P.2d 392 (1970).
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Plaintiffs would misconstrue the purpose of governmental
regulation of building activity.

Building and demolition permits

are required to regulate the construction industry and enforce
safety codes and practices.

The purpose of permits is not to

determine whether the permittee is authorized by the owner.

The

true purpose was recognized by the New York Court of Appeals in
its decision in Rolfe v. Village of Falconer, 467 N.E. 2d 517
(N.Y. 1984).

In Rolfe, the Court held that the purpose of

building permits was to assure compliance with pertinent
construction laws.

The issuance of such permits is not to

protect owners from unauthorized contractors who wrongly
represent to the village that they have authority to obtain the
permit.

The New York Court dismissed a claim that the

municipality was responsible because it issued a permit for the
acts of unauthorized contractors.
Similarly in the instant matter, the demolition permit is
issued to assure compliance with Park City Ordinances,

not to

determine whether the permittee is authorized or to prevent
unauthorized acts of contractors.

Plaintiffs were made aware of

the fact that Deer Valley's contractor and not Park City
demolished the shack they claim.

Plaintiffs chose to ignore this

fact and simply failed to sue the responsible parties, Deer
Valley Resort Company and Lloyd Brothers Construction.
Plaintiffs1 claim that Park City destroyed the shack is simply
not supported by the record.
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Finally, Plaintiffs1 claim that the Trial Court erred in
ruling that no believable evidence as to value of the shack was
offered is also unfounded.

Only one of the Plaintiffs attempted

to place a value on the shack.

After the Court had heard

numerous witnesses testify as to the abandoned derelict and
decrepit nature of the shack, it found such evidence as to value
unbelievable and speculative.
The Trial Court is well within its prerogative to view the
demeanor of witnesses and believe or disbelieve their testimony.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the above issues raised by the PlaintiffAppellants, there are other matters that the trial court decided
and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed which support the overall
decision that title be quieted to the State of Utah.

No notice

of claim, as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah
Code Annotated, §63-30-1, et. seq., was filed against the State
of Utah.

Therefore, the matter was dismissed as against the

State, which was an indispensable party.

With the State being

dismissed as a party, and being indispensable to the quiet title
case, there can be no successful claim of quieting title against
Park City Municipal Corporation.
Plaintiffs are asserting ancient claims, which should have
been asserted by their ancestors decades ago hoping to undermine
the superior title of the State.
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Despite the difficulties

inherent in trying matters which occurred many years ago, the
State was able to prove its superior title.

Neither of the

theories put forth by the Plaintiffs, adverse possession, or
prescriptive, are viable, and this Court should affirm the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiffs also failed to show that Park City destroyed the
shack.

In fact, it was proven at trial that an independent

third-party destroyed the shack.

This Cause of Action also

failed at trial and on initial appeal, and this Court should
affirm this ruling.
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1989.

<3\^praig Sm>th
At£o r n e^rTor
Defendant/Respondent
Park C i t y Municipal
Corporation

R. Paul Van Dam,
Attorney General
Alan Bachman,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
State of Utah
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9tmction of home on property. The District Court, Summit County, Leonard H.
Russon, J., quieted title in the state and
dismissed the complaint Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J.,
held that; (1) plaintiffs failed to establish
title to the property by deed; (2) tax deed
statute of limitations was inapplicable; (3)
plaintiffs failed to prove payment of taxes
for seven-year period necessary to claim
adverse possession; and (4) prescriptive
easement to the property was not established.
Affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error <*»S42(2)
In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, the Court of Appeals applies a
correction of error standard with no deference to the trial court
2. Taxation «=»726
Person who has duty to pay taxes cannot fail to pay taxes and subsequently purchase the land at tax sale and thereby
attempt to strengthen his title to the property.

• I(Y IUMMI SWIM

=>

Velma MARCHANT. Elma Winterton.
Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, Mona
Lichty, Merle Anderson, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
PARK CITY, a municipal corporation,
and the State of Utah, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 880131-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 13, 1989.
Plaintiffs sued to quiet title to certain
property and to recover damages for de-

3. Taxation e»805<2)
One who has tax deed but does not
hold title to the property cannot assert the
special statute of limitations applicable to
tax titles. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-5.1.
4. Adverse Possession «=»8<K2)
For adverse possession purposes,
plaintiffs' predecessors at most received
title only to improvements described in
deeds and not underlying land where language in deeds described property as "that
certain frame dwelling house by Lumber
Yard" and "house in lumber yard"; title to
real property by deed was not established
as against the state even though the state's
chain of title was flawed.
5. Taxation *»726
Quit claim deeds from county to plaintiffs' predecessor received after payment
of delinquent taxes and tax deed did not
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strengthen predecessor's title to the property but merely indicated that he paid delinquent taxes on the property.
6. Taxation «=*805<2)
Tax deed statute of limitations did not
apply against state's claim of ownership of
real property where plaintiffs' predecessors received quit claim deeds from county
on various dates after paying delinquent
taxes and received a tax deed to the improvements. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-5.1.
7. Adverse Possession *=>95
Proponent of an adverse possession
claim has the burden of proving full statutory compliance, including the payment of
all taxes levied and assessed.
8. Adverse Possession *»94
If party in possession of property and
his predecessors have paid taxes based on
value of improvements on the property and
no taxes have been levied based on valuation of the landt party has established title
to the property by adverse possession if all
other elements of adverse possession are
met.
9. Adverse Possession *=»95
Payment of taxes for seven-year period necessary for adverse possession was
not proven by tax deeds and letter which
indicated only that predecessor had paid
delinquent taxes on personal property at
various tax sales and that taxes were assessed but not paid during years plaintiffs
claimed to have established title by adverse
possession and evidence that predecessor
paid taxes on improvements for three years
during period in which state's predecessor
in title paid real property taxes on underlying land. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-7.1.
10. Advene Possession *=»94
Payment of delinquent taxes at a tax
sale cannot be used to establish the payment of taxes necessary to a successful
claim of adverse possession. U.C.A.1963,
78-12-7.1.
11. Easements *=H1
Prescriptive easement does not result
in ownership but allows only use of property belonging to another for a limited purpose.

12. EasemenU «=»36(3)
Claimant of prescriptive easement has
the burden of proving the necessary elements by clear and convincing evidence,
13. Appeal and Error *=>901
Appellants claiming prescriptive east*
ment contrary to trial court findings we*%
required to marshal! all evidence supports
ing the trial court's findings and then to
demonstrate that the evidence, when
viewed most favorafc^y to the trial court,
was insufficient; appellants were required
to marshall evidence which would support
each element required to prove their claim
of prescriptive easement
14. Appeal and Error *»756, 760(1)
Court of Appeals will not consider eonelusory arguments without citation to either the record or cases involving pivotal
issues.
15. Appeal and Error •=•173(9, 10)
Issues of laches and estoppel which
were not raised in the trial court would not
be considered on appeal.

Robert Felton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs-appellants.
J. Craig Smith, James W. Carter, Park
City, for Park City.
Alan Bachman, Salt Lake City, for State.
OPINION
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD
and ORME, JJ.
- - - - - - - --;
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellants challenge the trial court's ruling that they did not have vested title to
certain real property in Park City and thus
were not entitled to recover damages for
destruction of the home on the property.
Appellants claim that they have title to
property through adverse possession, deed*
or alternatively, that their use was prijj
criptive. Accordingly, they claim entftfl^
ment to $20,000 in damages for the dq
struction of the residence on the property
We affirm.
t^
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In August of 1981, Park City issued a
demolition permit to Deer Valley Resort to
remove a building. The building was demolished by Lloyd Brothers Construction
Company between August 4 and September 7 of 1981 allegedly to build an access
road to Deer Valley Resort Appellants
brought this action seeking to quiet title to
the real property and to recover damages
for the destruction of the home located on
the property.
According to appellants, their grandfather, William Rolfe, possessed the home
and yard on the property from 1910 until
his death in 1939. After his death, his wife
continued to occupy the property until
1946. She died in about 1949. William
Rolfe's son, Charles Rolfe, rented out the
house from 1949 until about 1964. Charles
Rolfe died in 1966 and his wife, Ethel
Rolfe, died in 1981. Charles Rolfe's daughters, appellants, claim to have visited the
property at least once a year since 1964.
In support of their claim that they have
vested title to the property, appellants rely
on the following documents:
1. A quit claim deed from Dan and
Belle McPolin to Jesse McCarrell dated
March 19, 1906 for ''that certain one-story
framed, three-room dwelling house situated
on the easterly side of Silver Creek and
about 100 feet easterly from the lumberyard of the Summit Lumber Company."
2. A quit claim de^d from Summit
County to William Rolph [sic] dated June
10, 1914 for $28.68 for "[improvements
East U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah." The
quit claim deed states that the deed is
"made from title secured from a tax sale in
the year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to
Summit County, dated May 1st, 1914."
3. A quit claim deed from Summit
County to William Rolfe dated June 21,
1917 for $1.00 for "that certain frame
dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park
City, Summit County, Utah, assessed to
William Rolfe in the year 1912."
4. A letter from the Summit County
Treasurer to Charles Rolfe dated May 16,
1957 stating that in 1938 the county issued
a quit claim deed to Charles Rolfe's father.
The letter also stated that from 1940 to

1954, taxes were taken care of by widows
abatement and that Charles Rolfe paid taxes of $8.06 in 1955 and $7.33 in 1956.
5. A tax deed from Summit County to
Charles Rolfe dated June 13, 1963 for
"House in lumber yard," stating "[tjhis
conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee of the sum of $12.53
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and
costs, constituting a charge against said
real estate for the year 1958 in the sum of
$7.81."
The State of Utah claims chain of title
through a series of documents, all of which
were recorded, and all, except numbers 3, 4
and 5 below, contained a metes and bounds
description of the property. The documents are as follows:
1. A patent from the United States
government, undisputedly containing the
property in question, to George Snyder on
April 5, 1882.
2. A deed from George Snyder to the
Park City Smelting Company, dated November 14, 1883.
3. A deed from the Park City Smelting
Company to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H.
Hollister on September 21, 1912. The deed
did not contain a metes and bounds description, but described the conveyed property
as "all of the real property or rights or
interest in real property belonging to the
Park City Smelting Company and situated
in the County of Summit, Utah."
4. A deed from the executors of Lewis
H. Withey's estate to Silver King Coalition
Mines Company on November 5, 1926. The
deed did not have a metes and bounds
description, but conveyed "all the estate,
right, title, interest, property, claim and
demand whatsoever of the said Lewis H.
Withey ... [of] the property above described."
5. A trustee's deed from Clay Hollister,
Withey's tenant in common, to Silver King
Coalition Mines on February 18, 1927. The
deed did not contain a metes and bounds
description but described the property as
"all other real property or rights or interests in real property . . . belonging to Park
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City Smelting Company, and situated in the
County of Summit, State of Utah."
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition
Mines Company to United Park City Mines
Company, dated May 8, 1953.
7. A deed from United Park City Mines
Company to Park City, dated April 2, 1969.
8. A deed from Park City to the State
of Utah, dated June 7, 1982.
There was no evidence that anyone other
than William Rolfe paid taxes on the property until 1931. From 1931 to 1953, the
real property in question was assessed as
part of Silver King Coalition Mines Company. From 1954 to 1969, real property taxes
were assessed to and paid by United Park
City Mines.
The trial court found that appellants'
chain of title was discontinuous and, at
best, conveyed title to improvements on the
property only. The court concluded that
the State's claim to title of the property
was superior to that of appellants and,
therefore, quieted title in the State of Utah
and dismissed appellants' complaint
On appeal, appellants assert that 1) the
trial court erred in finding that they did not
have vested title to the property by deed or
adverse possession; 2) even if appellants
do not have title to the property, they established prescriptive use; 3) respondents
are barred from challenging appellants' tax
title by the statute of limitations set forth
in Utah Code Ann- j 78-12-5.1 (1987); and
4) respondents' claims are barred by laches
and estoppel
Vested Title
Appellants first claim on appeal that the
trial court erred in concluding they did not
have vested title to the property by deed.
Appellants assert they obtained tax title to
the property by virtue of the 1914 quit
claim deed and the 1963 tax deed from
Summit County, and any action challenging
that title is barred by the four year statute
of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-6.1 (1987). In addition, they claim
title under the Marketable Record Title
Act Utah Code Ann. 5 57-9-1 through -10
(1986), commencing with the 1917 quit

claim deed as the "root" of title. The trial
court concluded that the tax deeds under
which appellants claimed title did not convey title to the underlying real property.
[1-3] In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of
error standard with no deference to the
trial court Creer v. Valley Bank and
Trust Co., 770 P.2d 113 (1988). A person
who has a duty to pay taxes cannot fail to
pay taxes and subsequently purchase the
land at a tax sale and thereby attempt to
strengthen his title to the property. Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah
1982); Crofts v. Johnson, 6 Utah 2d 350,
313 P.2d 808, 810 (1957). In addition, one
who has a tax deed but does not hold title
to the property cannot assert the special
statute of limitations contained in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987). Dillman,
656 P.2d at 978-79.
[4-6] In this case, there is no indication
that William Rolfe was the record titleholder. Even assuming he received quit claim
deeds from Summit County^ 1914, 1917
and 1957 after paying delinquent taxes, we
agree with the trial court that, at most, he
received title to the improvements described in the deeds. The 1963 tax deed,
similarly, conveyed only the improvements,
not the underlying real property. Taxes at
that time were apparently separately assessed on improvements and real property
in Summit County, and the State's predecessor in title, United Park City Mines, paid
real property taxes from 1954 to 1969.
The deeds did not strengthen Roife's title
to the property, but merely indicated that
he paid delinquent taxes on the property.
The State's title, on the other hand, while
flawed, is clearly superior to that of appellants. Therefore, we hold that the trial
court did not err in concluding that appellants failed to establish title to the property
by deed and that the tax deed statute of
limitations was inapplicable.
Adverse Possession
[7,8] Appellants' second assertion of
error is that the trial court erred in finding
that appellants did not have title to the
property by adverse possession. The pro-
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pouent of an advene possession claim has
the burden of proving full statutory compliance, including the payment of all taxes
levied and assessed. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600
P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979). However, if a
party in possession of property and his
predecessors have paid taxes based on the
value of improvements on the property and
no taxes have been levied based on the
valuation of the land, the party has established title to the property by adverse possession if all other elements of adverse
possession are met Park West Village,
Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Utah
1986); see also Royal Street Land Co. v.
Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987).
In Avise, the trial court found that Mrs.
Lake failed to acquire title to property because she failed to pay taxes on the property. The Utah Supreme Court reversed,
stating that the trial court's finding that
Mrs. Lake failed to pay taxes on the property was contrary to the evidence. The
court noted that an employee of the Summit County assessor's office testified at
trial that he had searched the records in
that office and could find no evidence that
any taxes had been assessed on the land
prior to 1975. The undisputed evidence
established that Mrs. Lake received a tax
notice every year and paid the tax that was
levied Although those taxes were based
only on the value of the improvements on
the property, the Utah Supreme Court held
that because no other taxes were levied,
Mrs. Lake had "paid all taxes levied and
assessed" in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. i 78-12-12 (1977). The court also
noted that there was no evidence that there
were any delinquent taxes owing on the
land for the years prior to 1975 or that the
land had been sold by the County for failure to pay taxes for those years.
[9,10] Appellants claim that this case is
indistinguishable from Avise. We disagree. In Avise, unlike this case, Mrs.
Lake established that she had paid taxes on
the improvements to the property for twenty-three years. In this case, however, the
only evidence that appellants' predecessors
had paid taxes on the property for seven
continuous years were quit claim and tax

deeds and a letter from Reed Pace to
Charles Rolfe. There was no evidence that
taxes were paid prior to delinquency. At
best, the deeds and letter indicate that William Rolfe paid delinquent taxes on the
personal property at various tax sales.
Further, appellants established that
Charles Rolfe paid taxes on improvements
on the property in 1955, 1956 and 1958, but
it was also proven that real property taxes
were paid by Silver King Coalition Mines
Company those same years. Thus, unlike
Avise, appellants failed to prove that they
paid taxes on the home or on the underlying land for a continuous seven year period See Utah Code Ann. $ 78-12-7.1
(1987). Payment of delinquent taxes at a
tax sale cannot be used to establish the
payment of taxes necessary to a successful
claim of adverse possession. Otherwise,
anyone purchasing property at a tax sale
would be able to claim the number of years
taxes had gone unpaid as a credit on the
seven year period required for adverse possession. In addition, in contrast to Avise,
the quit claim deeds themselves establish
that taxes were assessed and not paid during the years appellants claim to have established title by adverse possession.
Therefore, we hold that appellants failed to
sustain their burden of proving payment of
taxes for the requisite seven year period,
and the trial court correctly concluded that
appellants did not acquire the property by
adverse possession.
Prescriptive Easement
[11-14] Appellants also assert that
even if they do not have fee title to the
property by adverse possession or chain of
title, they have a prescriptive easement
Appellants are unclear as to what they
claim flows from the alleged prescriptive
easement If they claim that a prescriptive
easement, if established, would give them
ownership rights in the underlying property, they err. See Osborn <& Caywood
Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382
(Colo.CtApp.1983). A prescriptive easement does not result in ownership, but
allows only use of property belonging to
another for a limited purpose. North Un*
ion Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179
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(Utah 1976). A preemptive easement
"arises under our common law from a use
Q! tbe servient estate that te 'open, notorious, adverse, and, continuous for a period
of 20 yean.'" Crone a Crone, 688 P.2d
1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (quoting / m j m *
Broum, 689 P.2d 150, 162 (Utah 1981)).
The trial court concluded that appellants
had not established a prescriptive easement1 A clamant of prescriptive easement most establish the necessary elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Garmond * /ft**** 91 NJL 646, 579
P.2d 178, 178 (1978). .Appellants not only
had the burden of proof at trial, but, on
appeal art similarly required to marsball
all evidence supports** the trial court's
findings,and then to demonstrate that the
evidence, when viewed most favorably to
the trial court, is insufficient
Scharfv.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985). Appellants have not marshalled the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings in connection with the issue of prescriptive easement It further follows that
on appeal, appellants are required to marshal! evidence which would support each
element required to prove their claim of
prescriptive easement For example, the
trial court found that appellants' predecessors in interest worked for Silver King
Coalition Mines Company, and were given
permission by the company to build a house
on the property in question. Appellants
claim that this finding is not-supported by
the evidence but they do not provide other
argument or reference to the trial record to
establish that the use was "adverse," one
of the required elements for prescriptive
easement Similarly, appellants have not
compiled evidence which establishes the
other necessary elements and have further
failed to analyze what rights or claims to
dasnag^a-txA^ut flew tiom tt» aQegedpteacripthre easement We will not consider
conchsory arguments without citation to
either the record or cases involving pivotal
issues, Randall * Salvation Army, 100
Nov. 466. 686 P.2d 241,244 (1984). There-

fore, we find that appellants did not establish a prescriptive easement to the property.

L The court slso concluded thst the prescriptive
easement dsim was Birred by Utah Code Ann.
|,7MM(1967). However, in MorHt%BbaU,
49 Utah 244 141 P» 1127 (1916), the Utah Si>

Caches and Estoppel
[15] Finally, appellants assert that Park
City is baited from claiming ownership of
the property by laches and estoppel.
Those issues were not raised in the trial
court and, therefore, we decline to reach
them. See Jame$ * Preston, 746 P.2d 799,
801 (Utah CtApp.1987).
Affirmed/
DAVIDSON and ORME, JJ„ concur.
fo finw**isnTUi>

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHANT, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO. 7174

vs.

PARK CITY, a Municipal
corporation, JACK COPPEDGE,
and the STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants.

The above case was tried, commencing May 6, 1937.

The

Court received evidence by way of testimony, exhibit, and stipulation, and after hearing final arguments of counsel, took the
matter under advisement.

The Court has now reviewed the evidence

and law in this matter, and renders its Memorandum Decision
as follows:
1.

The defendants1 title to the underlying property in

question, even with the claimed Michigan Trust Company gap,
is superior to the title line claimed by the plaintiffs.

The

defendants1 title is traceable to the patent of the United States
Government.

Plaintiffs1 title is insufficient in description

and continuity. The plaintiff does not have title to the underlying
property.

Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improve-

ments on the underlying property.

MA?':1'-'-

. AFf

CITY

;,": q \ i e s t i :

. -.-:E

MEMOPANL'JM

';^ ir c l a i m s a r e b a r r e l i.

8,

For

*:L ^

wore

se/en

years

-.e s t a t u t e

pricr

tn

*":•' r" : i t ,f- fc t, in q u e s t i o n w . : - **

CoTplair.t
rat..
a

PAoE

, •
H e 3f

*ba* i:.ned ,

deter::rv

d i d n o t c-:.p /
9.

7*

,-

'

DEVr

;f

l.mi-i

' na o f

*

th

•• ^ e s s e - uy p l a i n t i f f s

empt-

and

*;ipft

•

:;s« r a r e v i s i t s c l a ' . ! " * '

•

.1

..eten.;ant

- possession.
»r t a x

cc •' *: -jd n « i y

deeds

f1

,ft

house

ana

n-

9

u n d e r l y i n g proper*:^
• - r 1 j: t. 1 ve
;jlies

only

easene"

t o use

1

f

a p p l i c a b l fl

•1

,y"„ co t i t , l e

- * ^!tv, ^

claims

ee

simple.
1
wti-'i

' ' w • :;<,se v h i c h had b e e r "w^ H

-x„,ed

,2* d e m o l i s h e d <'

lega* actio*.

« 1

M* '

demolition
strur '

of

,i

i,2

7 ^' ..

"'

_«^

1 .v "ID , • i-

>
-

f' ->••,'.
• •"

!

l-ar;ii>i 'Mr;"

The g r a n t i n c

a contractcr
ori

jeman^e*-?

f 3r pe- >
' .

"i

arty,

fft

* ' .M n o u s e was a b a n d o n s i

d, * r 11 y

. i.catior

fc;

.

I|1

,*,, ,u(

•-*

n
at-,'tior

proper a p p l i c a t i o n

sui h r'---i

f « >TI .

« ^-mg

*rticipate

^

le-

e thereof*
penrnr
1

he j.'-eoct was wr ".}fj*iy

t h e r e i n u n l a w f u l l y p e r f n i mr i .

j

r W

abate

>
J,

. • • •

and c o n s i d e r e d

,.\ \y g r a n t e d
City

•. ^ i e c e s s - ' -

, 0 .3 s t i f f s '

.

,

'-v t c

mpose

otitairei

or

liability
tne

."

MARCHANT V-. PARK CITY

13.

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs make nc claim against the State of Utah

for removal or destruction of the house.
14.

Even if plaintiffs had established liability on a

party hereto for destruction of the house in question, the evidence
of such damage is insufficient for an award to be made.

There

was no evidence presented as to the value of this old building,
and no finding could be made without gross speculation in regards
thereto.
15.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs1 claims are barred by

the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1, et seq.
No notices of claim were filed within one year after the claim
arose as required by that Act.

The plaintiffs were aware of

the destroyed building prior to Labor Day 1981.
claim was ever filed against the State of Utah.

No notice of

Notice of claim

was filed against Park City on September 20, 1982, more than
one year after the plaintiffs learned of the destruction of
the building.

The very latest the claim could arise was at

that time.
16.

Title to the land in question is quieted in the defen-

dants (State of Utah).

Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages

against these defendants.
Attorney for the defendant Park City will prepare the appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and
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submit the « » « *.
e same
*Q Plaintiffs' a tto
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

I

day of November, 1939,

four copies of the foregoing document were mailed, first class,
postage prepaid to:

Robert Felton, Esq.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

JCS.429

J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
Park Cicy Municipal Corporation
445 Marsac Avenue
P.O. Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (801)649-9321
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHA^i,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS) Ut tALl AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

Civil No,
PARK CITY, a munic ipal
corporation, JACK
COPPEDGE, and the STATE
OF UTAH,
Defendants.
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Robert Felton, Fsq,, tor the Plaintiffs,

Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, Mona Liechty
and Merle R. Anderson.
At

the Trial

testimony,

exhibit

the Court
and

received

stipulation

evidence

and heard

by

way of

argument by

counsel representing the respective parties.
Having given full consideration to all of the testimony
heard and evidence admitted and having reviewed
memoranda

and

heard

the

oral

argument,

and

the legal
now

being

appraised as to all and singularly the law and the facts of
the matter, the Court herewith makes and enters its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

real

property

in

question

which

was

the

subject of this action is described as follows:
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian thence North 36°40,9" West 71.46 feet; thence
North 57°29,15M East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58'45"
East 70,93 feet; thence South 55°6'25" West 55.77 feet
to the point of beginning.
2.

The chain of title through which Defendant State

of Utah claims
traceable

to

title to the real property
the

patent

derived

from

in question is

the

United

States

Government.
3.

The real property in question was previously owned

by Silver King Coalition Mines Company.

-2-

It was

a common

practice for Silver King Coalition Mines Company to allow
miners to construct houses on real property

the Company

owned.
4.

Plaintiffs*

predecessors

in interest worked for

Silver King Coalition Mines Company and were permitted to
construct a house on the real property in question.
5.

The

underlying

real

property

in

question

was

assessed by Summit County separately from the house located
thereon claimed by Plaintiffs,
6.

Defendant's predecessors in interest paid all real

property taxes assessed against the underlying real property
in question.
7.

Neither

Plaintiffs

nor

their

predecessors

in

interest paid any taxes on the underlying real property in
question.
8.

Plaintiffs did not have possession of the real

property in question for a period in excess of seven years
prior to filing their complaint; it was abandoned, empty and
open and in a state of deterioration and was rarely visited
by Plaintiffs.
9.

The chain of title through which Plaintiffs claim

title to the real property in question is discontinuous.
10.
were

The tax deeds through which Plaintiffs claim title

given

by

Summit

County

pursuant

to

unpaid

tax

delinquencies on the improvements located on the underlying
real property in question.
-3-

11.

The house which

had been owned by Plaintiffs'

predecessors was removed or demolished by a third party, not
a party to this action.
12.

Because of the abandoned and deteriorated nature

of the house on the property Park City granted a demolition
permit

for

the

demolition

of

the

house,

on

proper

application, to a third party claiming ownership of the
house*
13.

There was no evidence presented as to the value of

the house and no finding as to the value can be made without
gross speculation.
14.

Plaintiffs were aware of the destruction of the

house prior to September 7, 1981.
15.

No

notice

of

claim

was

ever

filed

by

the

Plaintiffs against Defendant State of Utah.
16.

Notice of claim was filed against Defendant Park

City on September 20, 1982, more than one year after the
Plaintiffs learned of the destruction of the house.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The chain of title through which the Defendant

State of Utah claims title is superior to the chain of title
through which Plaintiffs claim title,
2.
underlying

Plaintiffs'
real

claim

property

insufficient descriptions

to
in

title

by

question,

deed
fails

to

the

due

to

in the claimed deeds and a lack

of

continuity

of

Plaintiffs'

claimed

chain

of

title.

Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improvements
located upon the real property in question.
3.

The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title

to the real property conveyed improvements only and had no
effect on title to the underlying real property in question.
4.

The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title

to the underlying real property in question add nothing to
the title of the Plaintiffs1.
5.

Adverse possession cannot be had against Defendant

Park City, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, or
against

Defendant

State

of

Utah

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated § 78-12-13, 1953 as amended.
6.

Plaintiffs' claim of title to the real property in

question by adverse possession and claim of easement by
prescription

are

barred

by

the

applicable

statute

of

limitations pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5, 1953
as amended.
7.
barred

Plaintiffs' claim against the State of Utah is
by

Plaintiffs'

failure

to

comply

with

the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated 5 63-30-1,
et. seq.
8.

Plaintiffs'

claims

against

Defendant

Park City

Municipal Corporation are barred by Plaintiffs' failure to
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Annotated § 63-30-1, et, seq.
-5-

9.

Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession of the

real property

in question

fails, pursuant

to Utah Code

Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, for failing to show
payment of all taxes which have been levied and assessed
upon the real property in question according to law.
10.

Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession of the

real property in question and of prescriptive easement fail
since possession by Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest was
not adverse to the interests of Defendants' predecessors in
interest.
11.

Plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement to the

entire area

of

the real property

in question

fails as

inapplicable to the facts of the case and concerns only use
rather than possession of or title to real property.
12.
for

Defendant Park City is not liable to Plaintiffs

issuing

application,
wrongfully

a

demolition

permit,

notwithstanding

whether

obtained

or

the

based

on

the

demolition

proper

permit

work

was

unlawfully

performed.
13.

Plaintiffs have stated no claim against the State

of Utah for the destruction of the house.
14.

Plaintiffs' complaint, and each cause thereof,

should be dismissed with prejudice and title to the real
property in question should be quieted in the State of Utah
free

and

clear

of

any

interest,

encumbrance by Plaintiffs.
-6-

lien,

easement,

or

15.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages against

Defendants.

Wherefore,
Defendants

let

judgment

and against

the

be

entered

Plaintiffs

in

favor

in accordance

these findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Dated this

<£#L day of June, 1987

By the Court

5/ticker
Leonard H. Russon
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

XZJ Cr^Tfe Staitn, Esq,
C^Attorney
attorney for Defendai
Defendant
Park City Municipal Corporation

Alan Bachman, Esq.
for Defendant

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
Park Cicy Municipal Corporation
445 Marsac Avenue
P.O. Box 1480
Park Cicy, Ucah 84060
Telephone: (801)649-9321
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHANT, et al.
Plaintiffs,

J
)

v.

:

JUDGMENT

'
Civil No. 7174
]
;) Honorable Leonard H. Russon

PARK CITY, a municipal
corporation, JACK
COPPEDGE, and the STATE
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

:

This matter came regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding,
the Trial concluded on May 7, 1987, after all parties had
fully presented all evidence and argued their respective
positions.

The

parties

appeared

through,

and

were

represented by, their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith,
Esq., Assistant City Attorney, and James V. Carter, Esq.,
City

Attorney,

for

Defendant

Park

City

Municipal

Corporation, Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General

for Defendant State of Utah, and Robert Felton, Esq., for
Plaintiffs, Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod,
Mona Liechty and Merle R. Anderson.

Evidence was received in the form of testimony, exhibit:
and stipulation, oral argument on the facts and law were
made

by

respective

counsel

and

legal

memoranda

were

submitted.

Having
admitted,
argument

given

full

the

legal

made,

the

consideration

memoranda
Court

to

submitted,

having

entered

the
and
a

evidence
the

oral

Memorandum

Decision and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law does hereby Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows:

1.

Plaintiffs Complaint, and each cause thereof, is

dismissed with prejudice.

2.

Fee ownership of the real property in question,

which is particularly described as:
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast
one-quarter of the Northeast one-auarter Section 16,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian thence North 36*40f9" West 71.46 feet; thence
North 57°29l15,f East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58l45,f
East 70.93 feet; thence South S S ^ ^ " West 55.77 feet
to the point of beginning.

-2

is quieted in the State of Utah free of any interest, lien,
easement, or encumbrance of Plaintiffs,

3.

Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees and

costs of court.

4.

This is a final and appealable judgment.

DATED this _ £

day of J-tttreT 1987.

BY THE COURT

Sf

^cmtr

F,

\jui\ktr)Scn

Leonard H. Russon
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

k

\ Craij^mi^k/Esd.
torri^y^or Defendant
Park City Municipal Corporation

&

<%•
LJU^
Bachman, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant,
Seaitf oj

Felton,. Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT 7
No person shall be held to answer for .
crime, unless on a presentment oYjZm*f
' O P „ o t h e r w i f e WMMW.
f
>n cases ansin* in the land or naval W e t
° - * Graod Jur* « « *
actual service in time of W.r or nublfc ? ' " 10 t h e M U i * . * h « «
d a n W ; n o r sh
be subject for the same offence to L t l /
*
»U " 7 person
nor shall be compelled i?Z£
*%i!
>* ln * w ^ « Ut/Jumb.
himself, nor be deprived of iff/ S i
! C a s e t o b e • witness against
due
of Uw ; nor shall private property * ukJ^'L**™
P"«»
v
7 De t a l t e n f
compensation.
°r public use, without just

Section 1.

AMENDMENT XIV

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ART.

I, § 7

Sec. 7. [Due process of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

CHAPTER 12
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
78-12-5. Seizure or possession within seven years necessary.
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall
be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven
years before the commencement of the action.

78-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in
owner.
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof,
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of
the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the
commencement of the action.

78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
(1) where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(2) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel,
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for
the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part
improved and cultivated.

78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument
or judgment.
Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation of land
under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no
other, is deemed to have been held adversely.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under
written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming
title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
(1) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
<3) where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre.

78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways.
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares,
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of,
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser,
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may
be acquired.

78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and
that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.

PART III.
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS.

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(c) Affirmative defenses- In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, iryury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he haa
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.

CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state or its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Subsection 63-30-11(4).
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